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The sudden expansion of the state system in mid-twentieth century has
produced many unstable governments and quasi-states. These entities pos-
sess few of the traditional attributes of statehood and consequently provide
both motive and opportunity for foreign intervention through indirect
means. In addition, the bi-polarity of military power, the process of decolo-
nization, the undetermined status of many territories, the numerous ideolo-
gical struggles, the ready availability of weapons through various programs
of competitive arms shipments have in combination encouraged revolution-
ary and guerrilla movements.
Even though the activities involved are often directed toward under-
mining the legitimacy of a particular political order, they are usually
difficult to assimilate to the concept of "armed attack," and thus action
against such movements cannot be justified as self-defense, even where a
clear and effective link exists between such groups and the government
whose territory is used for organization and sanctuary.' It is generally
agreed that self-defense is the only lawful use of force permitted under the
Charter apart from Security Council action authorized under Chapter VII.
Consequently, given the paralysis of the Council, states who are targets of
irregular attacks may be left with no lawful means of defense.2
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'See Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons
Against Foreign States, 109ff (1962); Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of
Armed Bands, 7 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 712-13 (1958). When dealing with situations where
irregular forces are operating, characterization of the participants becomes extremely impor-
tant. This writer prefers irregular forces armed bands, or guerrillas as the most neutral despite
Richard Falk's argument that there is no noncumbersome neutral terminology. These terms
do find some support in the literature. The use of value-laden terms does tend to indicate
prejudgment and so there is no justification for using terms such as terrorist, guerrilla and
freedom fighter as legal equivalents if one is concerned with impartial inquiry. See Falk, The
Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation 63 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 415 (1969).2As both Falk and Bowett point out in recent articles, the use of force by way of reprisals
is illegal under the Charter. Falk, supra note I: Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to
Armed Force, 66 AM. J. OF INT'L L. I (1972) and sources cited note 2.
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The primary concern of this essay is the regulation of guerrilla forces
which operate across recognized international boundaries and/or cease fire
lines. These guerrilla forces may operate either within, or in the absence of,
a formal state of armed conflict. Such movements occupy an intermediate
position between the organization of hostile military expeditions and pri-
vate revolutionary activities. Though guerrilla activities and other indirect
means of coercion occupy a separate and distinct position on the influence
continuum, difficulties in making appropriate legal judgments arise because
no clear boundaries exist either at the lower end of the continuum between
permissible and impermissible means of influence, or at the Lipper end
between indirect and direct uses of coercion.
Attempts to define the upper boundary have engendered considerable
debate. Given that self defense is the only legitimate use of force, and that
"collective security" guarantees have been ineffective in protecting vital
interests, states have endeavored to broaden the concepts of "aggression"
and "armed attack" to include some forms of indirect coercion. This would
enable a state to justify action against indirect coercive activities as mea-
sures of self, or collective self-defense. Not unexpectedly, the result has
been that the nature of the circumstances in which indirect coercion may
justify the resort to force in self-defense has remained largely undefined.
These differences of opinion are particularly evident in the recent de-
bates in the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. In
the three most recent proposals on defining aggression submitted for con-
sideration of the Special Committee, only the proposal sponsored by Ca-
nada, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States defined the
sponsorship of subversion and irregular forces as "armed attack."3
The other two proposals included these lesser forms of violence within
the general definition of aggression, but differentiated between the response
permitted to "direct" aggression and that permitted to "indirect" aggres-
sion. Though the exact limit of responses to indirect aggression are not
addressed in these other proposals, the general thrust of their provisions
indicates that indirect aggression is illegal, but that the use of indirect
methods by one state against another should not permit the target state to
invoke the right of self-defense under Article 5 1.4
There is substantial evidence which indicates that the sponsorship of
indirect aggression is an international delict. This has been a common
theme in the deliberations of the Sixth Committee, the various Special
a8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS665 (May 1969).
4Supra note 3, 661-65 especially at 664 para. 7. See also 8 UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE
25 (March 1971) and 8 UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE 44-46 (April 1971) for summaries of the
debates over these proposals.
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Committees, as well as in General Assembly Resolutions. The proposition
that subversion is not to be "tolerated, connived at,,or acquiesced in, has
received almost unanimous acceptance.'' 5 Despite general agreement on
the principle that the use of indirect methods are illegal, the critical prob-
lem of delimiting permissible responses remains.
In the case of coercion short of war the many different forms of coercive
influence have remained largely undifferentiated in law. Yet sporadic acts
of sabotage and occasional border raids would seem to give rise to different
factual situations from those which encompass sustained operations on
national territory. The type of activity, its duration, and the burden it
places upon the object state would all seem to be relevant to the evaluation
of situations where guerrillas are operating.
But most writers and statesmen have focussed upon overt uses of force
and have treated indirect coercion as an undifferentiated whole. Hence, the
major divergence among contemporary writers relates to differing per-
spectives on the consequences of permitting lesser forms of coercive force
to be used. Bowett and Stone argue that in the absence of effective action
by the organs of the United Nations, vital interests of states may be
adversely affected if states are not permitted a resort to force against such
provocations.
In this view, if force is not permitted as a sanction, unscrupulous states
may act with impunity since law-abiding states would have no redressO By
contrast, McDougal, Brownlie and Falk argue that the overwhelming in-
terest in order, and the potential cost of the resort to force with modern
weapons, counterbalance the occasional lesser wrongs which may go unre-
dressed because of the prohibition on force.7
5See for example: UNGAOR Twenty-first Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 87, UN
Doc. 1/6547 (1966); UN GAOR Twenty-second Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 87, UN
Doc. 1/6955 (1967); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty U.N. GAOR Res.
2131 (XX), 21 December 1965: reaffirmed as Res. 2225 (XXI) 19 December 1966. Of course
Richard Falk has argued that "the politics of terror and the use of exile sanctuaries to disrupt
'the enemy' society enjoys an ambiguous status in recent international experience." supra
note I at 424. What Falk fails to do is examine the comparability of his examples. It is highly
questionable that any or all of them can or should be regarded as law creating "facts." Surely
the status of governments in exile during World War 11 is qualitatively separable from that of
the status of the Bay of Pigs invasion force.
6Stone argues that indirect forms of coercion have survived the Charter, and so war is
lawful as a response even where a claim of self-defense cannot be justified. LEGAL CONTROLS
OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, 92- 103 (1959). Bowett's position is similar except that he
would permit responses to indirect attack to be labelled self-defense. SELF-DEFENSE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 23-25 (1958).
7McDoUGAL and FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, 207-208 n.
193 (1961);BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES, 279, 373
(1963); FALK, The Relevance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning of In-
ternational Law: An Intermediate View, 145 in HOFFMAN AND DEUTSCH (eds.), THL RELE-
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Both of these positions seem extreme. On the one hand the dangers of
nuclear war are obvious, but not every use of force or every conflict set
carries with it the potential for escalation. The risk of nuclear holocaust is
but one reason for the increased use of indirect methods. At least as
important in many cases is the simple fact that guerrilla operations do not
normally put a heavy strain on resources, and in unstable situations prom-
ise a substantial return for a minimal investment. Secondly, as long as
states perceive deterrence to be stable, even major nuclear states will be
able to engage in relatively extensive overt military operations in areas
which are of peripheral interest to other nuclear powers. And, lastly,
"lesser wrongs" have been more than occasional."
On the other hand, not every use of indirect coercion or even every use
of irregular forces is of sufficient scope and intensity to permit the target
state a resort to force which may involve the crossing of a territorial
frontier. To make such an argument comes close to identifying the right of
self-defense with the entirety of a state's legally protected interests, and
thus to equating self-defense with the right of self-help. Granted that in the
absence of effective United Nations action a substitute norm is needed, it
still does not follow that such a norm should license the use of force at will.
As Brownlie points out, the problem of guerrilla warfare may be better
understood if specific factual situations are enumerated. Thus the following
factual relationships may arise:
I. The organisation, with governmental complicity of armed bands of
emigr6s or other irregular groups on national territory, for incursion
into the territory of another state or states;
2. organisation of such bands by governments on non-national territory
for use in third states;
3. support for armed bands already operating on the territory of other
state:
4. toleration, with full knowledge of the organisation of bands on nation-
al territory:
5. negligence in control of armed bands and raiding groups operating
from national territory;
6. inability to control such bands on national territory. 9
VANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, (1968). In practice McDougal's position is much closer to
that of Stone than that of Falk. See McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-
Defense, 57 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 597-602 (1963). For an analysis see KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2nd ed. revised by ROBERT W. TUCKER), 75-80 and nn. 69-70.
8See BUCHAN, WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (1966); GANN, GUERRILLAS IN HISTORY
60-78 (1971); BELL, THE MYTH OF THE GUERRILLA: REVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND MAL-
PRACTICE (1971).
9 Brownlie, supra note I at 7 12-13.
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Brownlie's list can be simplified somewhat. There is general agreement
that there is no difference in terms of responsibility between toleration and
direct sponsorship, so categories one and four may be joined;10 similarly
there is no legal difference between organization and support, so categories
two and three may be joined as well. 1' Since negligence in control would
also engage responsibility, in effect there are three distinct situations rather
than six: (I) responsible-organization, support or toleration; (2) respon-
sible- negligent; and (3) non-responsible- inability to control.'2
In practice the distinction between responsibility and non-responsibility
may be irrelevant. In the absence of effective collective measures of fact
determination the three categories present one problem: what response?
Given the circumstances surrounding most ongoing guerrilla operations
there are often genuine questions as to the degree of knowledge and control
possessed by a government. Aid to guerrillas may come from third states,
some of which may be extra-regional. Actions of guerrilla bands may
involve the territory and property of third states.
The ideology of the guerrilla movement may command wide support
among the population. Financial support may come from ostensibly private
individuals who are citizens of third states. And, more to the point, even if
a government is unable to disassociate itself from the activities of the
guerrillas and is found responsible for their activities, as pointed out above,
there is still the problem of appropriate responses by the target state.
In effect, the criteria of the traditional law and the Charter favor covert
and indirect methods. The activities of irregular forces are seldom visible
enough to attract widespread attention outside of a few raids which cause
spectacular results, or which involve the interests of third states. If the
target state responds with overt force against either the presumed sponsor-
ing government or the guerrilla forces themselves, it runs the risk of being
tagged the "aggressor."
1 Supra pp 3-4 and nn. 4, 5; also Brownlie, supra note 9 at 718 and sources cited
therein.
"Of course this raises the question of what constitutes support. Many advocates,
particularly from small states, are willing to label verbal or ideological backing as support. On
the whole, though many states pay some lip service to "ideological aggression," the concept
does not seem well established in practice. Furthermore, since the establishment of respon-
sibility could lead potentially to a resort to force in retaliation by a target state, a more
substantial connection than verbal support of guerrilla operations would seem necessary. The
author suggests that proof of material aid would establish the necessary connection.
'
2There are three categories rather than two because of a presumed difference between
negligence and toleration. Toleration implies both knowledge and capacity to deal with the
guerrillas; negligence, a lack of knowledge (through negligence), but sufficient capacity. It is
acknowledged that the distinction between toleration and negligence is a fine one. Nonethe-
less, where true negligence is the case, it is assumed that some cooperative strategy for
redress may be worked out with the target state. If redress is not forthcoming, the negligence
becomes tolerance.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. I
200 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
The problem is a difficult one: how to permit effective responses to these
situations of relatively indirect and limited attack, without expanding the
right to use armed force to a point where self-defense can be invoked to
justify violent action against provocations that are trivial or non-existent.
The difficulty is to avoid major breaches of the peace of wide territorial
extent arising from defensive measures based upon vague evidence.
The basic problem can be defined as a situation in which a state which
serves as refuge and staging area, is unable or unwilling to undertake
remedial action against irregular forces or to permit the target state to do
so. Further, it is assumed that insofar as the target state has been able, it
has taken measures within its own territory to suppress the guerrilla activ-
ity, and has found these to be inadequate. Thirdly, there must be clear
evidence of ongoing illegal activity across an international border.
There are a number of approaches here. It could be argued for example
that remedial action in such a situation would not be directed against the
political independence and territorial integrity of the state of refuge, but
rather, specifically against those who have engaged in illegal activity. One
could attribute to irregular forces the status of pirates. International law
authorizes all states to seize and punish pirates, irrespective of nationality,
according to their own criminal procedures. The response of an aggrieved
state would then be directly against the individuals involved, not against
the state of which the pirate is a resident or citizen.
This formulation is unsatisfactory because it does not directly address
the problem of jurisdiction. Both in the traditional law and more recent
restatements of state obligations, territorial integrity and political in-
dependence are viewed as synonyms for territorial inviolability.13
Similarly the analogy of hot pursuit, when applied to the pursuit of
guerrilla forces on land, does not consider the limiting jurisdictional condi-
tion of the maritime right. Hot pursuit in maritime law ends the moment the
pursued ship enters its own territorial waters or those of a third state. 14 On
land no such general right exists, unless greated by specific treaty provi-
sions or the consent of the state from which the band operates. 15
13For example, the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, UN Doc. A/C. 6./L. 793. Also see Higgins, The Development of International Law
through the Political Organs of the United Nations, 175-230 and sources cited therein
(1963).
'
4Poulantzas, The Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law, 3, 345-48; Brownlie, supra
note 7 at 372 note 3; Bowett, supra note 6 at 38-41. For a recent statement defending such a
right see International Law and Military Operations against Insurgents in a Neutral Terri-
tory, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1127 (1968).
15Brownlie, supra note I at 730: Poulntzas, supra note 1I- 16. As Brownlie points out,
from time to time states have asserted such a right. A recent example is the French position
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A second and perhaps more fruitful approach is to argue that the loss of
effective control over the area of irregular operations implies that the loss
of authoritative jurisdiction and thus of territorial integrity. Logically, then,
action against these forces would not be action against the territorial
integrity and political independence of the offending state, but in support of
it. Despite the persuasiveness of logic, there is little evidence of acceptance
of this argument in contemporary practice. Neverthrless this is the logic
behind the customary law of neutrality, belligerency and insurgency and
would seem to be a viable position. If a neutral is unable to prevent the
belligerent violation of its territory, then the offended belligerent power
may take action on neutral territory to enforce belligerent rights. 16
This moves us no further toward a solution, but does permit the restate-
ment of the problem in an appropriate framework. If there is a right of
action, what it its scope? In the absence of authoritative third party review,
what frequency and level of activity against a state would permit a forceful
response across a recognized boundary?
The restraints, necessity and proportionality, which presumably govern
the right of beligerent retaliation against a prejudicial violation of neutrality
are those which govern the use of force in general. John Norton Moore has
observed:
Necessity and proportionality are shorthand for community policies restrict-
ing coercion to situations where there is no reasonable alternative to the use
of force for protection of fundamental values .... 17
The ambiguous nature and variable character of these restrainsts is ac-
knowledged. Within themselves, necessity and proportionality contain no
criteria for judgment, that is, as legal concepts they merely authorize
during the Algerian war. The French employed both the "right of hot pursuit" and the "right
of riposte," (firing into Tunisian territory) in the Algerian War in order to counteract the use
of Tunisian territory by the F.L.N. The Tunisian government refused to acknowledge that any
such rights existed. Although both governments made numerous complaints to the Security
Council neither side moved to have the Council consider them. For a discussion see Fraleigh,
The Algerian Revolution as a Case Study in International Law, 206- 207 in FALK, (ed.) THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR (1971). At worst the positive law in this area then may
be uncertain, but emphasizing the limiting criterion of territoriality would seem consonant
with state practice. See further, Pinto, Les Regles du Droit International Concernant la
Guerre Civile, RECUEIL DES COURs, 45 1, 544-48 (1965); Falk, International Law and the
United States Role in Vietnam:A Response to Professor Moore, 474-75, 490-93 in 1 FALK,
(ed.), THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW(1968).
16GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WELFARE, 538-540 (1960): KEL-
SEN-TuCKER, supra note 7 at 160-62; Brownlie, supra note 7, 309-316; 2 SCHWARZEN-
BERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS,
644-46 (1968).
17Moore, Legal Dimensions of the Decision to Intercede in Cambodia, 65 AM. J. INT'L
L., 53 ( 197 1).
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consideration of appropriate contextual criteria.18 Tucker notes in his dis-
cussion of necessity in self defense:
The degree of necessity held to justify measures of self-defense must largely
depend upon the immediacy of the danger posed to the state. The immediacy
of the danger, however, need not and, it is generally claimed, cannot be
gauged simply in terms of over action of an injurious nature... This being so,
the danger held to justify the taking not only of preventive, but of anticipatory
measures of self-defense will depend upon an interpretation of the signifi-
cance of behavior that falls short of being overt and unambiguous. Moreover,
if the uncertainty to be tolerated before resorting to preventive measures
must be related to the nature of the danger posed, the nature of the danger
will depend not only upon the animus thus far manifested by the other party
but also upon the means of injury the other party has at its disposal. 19
Applied to indirect coercion Tucker's argument has two important as-
pects. The first is that necessity is related to perceptions of immediacy; the
second, that immediacy and scope are governed by the means of injury
available to the other party. The content of necessity as a meaningful
restraint on retaliation against irregular forces depends upon defining "im-
mediacy."
Clearly the "immediacy" involved is not the "immediacy" of self de-
fense. If it were, there would be no need for a discussion of the problems
posed by irregular forces apart from general discussions of the require-
ments of self defense. It is seldom that single and isolated instances of
guerrilla activity are of sufficient scope and duration to jeopardize territo-
rial integrity and political integrity. Rather the threat stems from ongoing
operations or the accumulation of isolated events.
As Bowett has shown, the Security Council has rejected "accumulation
of events," reasoning when used by Israel in justification of raids against
the Palestinian irregulars. 20 The Council has instead preferred to deal with
each provocation-response as a discrete event. Condemnations of Israeli
actions have thus been based upon the disporportionality of means or the
inappropriateness of objectives. The question is whether the Council has
rejected "accumulation of events" reasoning per se, or only where such
reasoning seemingly would broaden the concept of self defense.
1 8Hence Baxter's point that judgments as to proportionality are "more of a political and a
military character than of a legal character" is as true as it is irrelevant. The same argument
applies to necessity, or any number of concepts in international law. There is nothing unusual
in international law about norms which authorize the consideration of political or military
criteria. This is not to underplay the difficulties involved in using the concepts. It is generally
not noted that while the United Kingdom accepted Webster's statement in the Caroline case
as to the requirements for self-defense, no agreement was ever reached on whether or not the
facts of the Caroline incident fell within the scope of these requirements. Baxter, The Legal
Consequences of the Unlawful Use of Force Under the Charter, PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 74 (1968).
'
9 KELSEN-TUCKER, supra note 7 at 8 I.
20Bowett, supra note 2 at 6-7.
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If the former, then to the extent that Council pronouncements diverge
from the necessities of action perceived by states, the authority of the
Council will be undermined. If the latter then "accumulation of events"
could be used in justification for retaliation by a target state where strict
attention has been paid to appropriateness of objectives and proportionality
of means.
This still leaves open the question of what appropriate targets and
proportionate responses may be. Does proportionality refer to the size and
character of the attack or to the total context of action? Or, rather, is
proportionality measured by the force necessary to repel an aggression or
by that necessary to remove the causes? With respect to self-defense there
is no question that the difference in permissible action between the two
concepts is significant. It is submitted, however, that the same dilemma is
not directly applicable to action in retaliation.
Given the character of indirect operations, the idea of repelling the
intended action has little meaning, nor does limited action conceived in
punitive or deterrent terms. Proportionality only has meaning if the scope
of permissible action is to reduce or remove the danger of ongoing oper-
ations. Restraint is then a function of targets and time. Action, insofar as
possible, should be directed against those directly involved, specifically
military and para-military installations and personnel. It should be regarded
as an exceptional action, limited in time, and not as a continuing policy.
In summary and as a guide to evaluating claims for action against
guerrilla forces the following points are relevant:
1. there should be a substantial connection between the prior commis-
sion of illegal acts and the resultant claim to act in retaliation;
2. the user of retaliatory force should have exhausted all means of
resistance available within its own territorial domain;
3. a diligent effort must have been made to obtain redress through
peaceful means;
4. the use of force should be directed so that loss of civilian life is
minimized:
5. the use of force should be directed primarily against military and
para-military targets and personnel. 21
21Falk, supra note I at 445. Falk's framework seems overly elaborate and repetitive.
Those considerations under heads Nos. 8, 10 and 12 would seem to be irrelevant: Nos. 4 and
10 are somewhat repetitious; while, if No. 2 could be realized a strong argument in terms of
self-defense could be made: No. 10 is also an unrealistic expectation in the context of most
guerrilla conflicts. For a statement of the traditional law of reprisal see SCHWARZENBERGER,
supra note 15, at 48-50.
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The question remains whether in these circumstances the action taken
should be termed "self-defense" or merely "retaliatory" but permissible. In
general this writer prefers the second alternative. This preference stems
from a reluctance to broaden the concept of self-defense to include indirect
attack. Where territorial integrity and/or political independence are not
immediately and severely affected, it is difficult to make an argument for
self-defense, and guerrilla violence seldom presents an immediate threat to
vital interests.
Even in the Middle East where perspective is easily distorted because of
the salience of Palestinian ideology and claims, the Israelis for the most
part have been able to control fedayeen violence through intelligence
operations, regular patrols and electronic surveillance. 22 While Israeli loss-
es have been painful, they have not been numerous, nor have they resulted
in major alterations in Israeli patterns of settlement and administration.
Yet, in the final analysis, if the states which serve as staging area and
refuge, fail in their obligation to police ongoing guerrilla campaigns and
refuse a cooperative strategy in ending the attacks, then targets states are
left with few choices. At present the Security Council determinations with
respect to Israeli actions are little more than legal ritualism; and to the
detriment of the Council's authority, legal ritualism is not self-enforcing. In
this view there is much to be said for the idea that the use of retaliatory
force is the ultimate demand for cooperative law enforcement. 23 While
violence might breed violence, violence is also the only effective counter to
violence. In the absence of effective community action to encourage re-
straint, self-help remains the only alternative.
22Bell, supra note 8 at 202-205.
2Falk, supra note I at 444.
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